Spinoza: Tractatus Theologico-Politicus
(Elwes Translation, Dover Publications, 1951)
I initially became familiar with the name of Spinoza when I was just coming to learn about philosophy for the first time. It was through a History of Modern Phil. course. At that point I became rather biased against him. The reasons, as they usually are at first, were not very good ones, but first impressions usually take more work than they should to eliminate. Basically it seemed to me that his views didn't seem very sensible. What does he mean, everything is the same thing in different modes? That sounds stupid. And that, in summary, was my knowledge of Spinoza
Time wore away the rash prejudices one holds towards philosophers in general, and now reading the Tractatus has changed the way I view this particular man roughly 180 degrees. That is to say, what I find remarkable about Spinoza now is his great deal of good sense.
Let us start with the conflict that has been viewed through several works here recently: that of faith and reason. Maimonides held that the two are not at all in conflict, that they can and must work together. As a result he tried to give reasonable explanations for everything in Scripture, while at the same time holding fast to the assumptions he carries from Muslim philosophy and Scripture in general. For the most part he does well, though success is far from certain. Pascal, on the other hand, held that reason has no place in trying to understand Biblical concepts: religious faith is a matter of feeling. Perhaps feeling is a good ground for faith, but one risks taking the 'reasonableness' from religion, especially in a world where people can and do disagree fundamentally about the most basic points.
It must first be remarked that Spinoza does not hold faith and reason to be compatible. They are different, and that is that: "[T]o separate faith from philosophy . . . is the chief aim of this whole treatise." (183) Spinoza's own division of works demonstrates this: The Ethics is his chief philosophical work, and the Tractatus is his religious work. As far as Maimonidean compatibilism, he mentions Maimonides by more than once, and flat out rejects his efforts.
But, and this is a big but, that in now way implies that we don't reason about Scripture. To believe in Biblical literalism, for Spinoza, is just as stupid as thinking one can reconcile everything religious with reason. Why? Well, as Spinoza does not hesitate to point out, the Bible contradicts itself, and more than once. And not just metaphorically, it literally says opposite things: "[I]t is untrue that Scripture never contradicts itself directly, but only by implication." (193) On this front he brings out example after example, mentioning not only historical details but characteristics of God as well. Can't we just say one reading is literal and the other metaphorical, like Maimonides does? His thoughts on metaphor are explicit, and can be summed up with this statement on literalists: "If the Bible could everywhere be interpreted after their fashion, there would be no such thing as a rational statement of which the meaning could be relied on . . . ." (153) Analyzing some statements as metaphors would put understanding of the Bible under the control of whoever is doing the analysis, and would essentially leave faith at the whim of interpreters. As I asked previously, which interpretation does one follow, and how does one know it is the correct one? Spinoza recognizes this problem and rejects metaphor to avoid it.
If we reject both literalism and metaphor, can we take from the Bible? How do we know what is truth and what is not? The truth, it so happens, is in the message, not the exact words. This is...unusually sensible for a time centuries past. What is the message? That God chose the Jews? That one must keep the Sabbath? That one must pray to the one God? No, no, and no. Ultimately, the story in the Bible is not only imperfect but unnecessary.
I...What?
...and nothing more.
The idea that the Bible is a literal history of all creation is wrong. The idea that the Law of God is a set of rules on a block of stone to be followed for all history is wrong. The prophets who told us the instructions for living were not superhuman; they contradicted each other and held the basic misunderstandings of their time. "[T]o suppose that knowledge of natural and spiritual phenomena can be gained from the prophetic books, is an utter mistake . . . ." (27) The prophets, Spinoza says, even misunderstood miracles, in that they witnessed explainable events and gave them the name of miracles and wonders as they did not understand the real cause. Yes, we are allowing science to tell us that parts of the Bible aren't God acting and smiting and whatnot.
The above understanding of prophets informs Spinoza's entire method of Scriptural interpretation. There is no search for literal statements or even a universal list of laws, in terms of a list of commands to be followed. "We are at work not on the truth of passages, but solely on their meaning." (105) The events covered in the Bible were not universal - they were events only concerning the Jews, made so that the Jews would come to understand what is essential, and thus not geared (and therefore unnecessary for) any other groups. That is to say, the very Ten Commandments are the commandments of the ancient Hebrew people; others are in no way bound by them. "All Scripture was written primarily for an entire people, and secondarily for the whole human race." And there are more explicit statements of this within. The events that occurred to the Jews and the messages of the prophets were all geared specifically towards that group of people with an end which we shall see shortly. Those messages do not apply to us if they do not have the same effect. Spinoza goes so far as to challenge the notion of a chosen people of God: "[W]herein man's true happiness consists, they were on a par with the rest of the nations." When they referred to themselves as God's people, it was because they had explicitly made a contract with God to form a state. That is all.
Not only that, but it's not as though the Bible is exactly as it should be, anyway. Recall: this is the mid-1600s. This is a Judeo-Christian thinker writing a theological treatise. Now observe:
That's right, the writers may have gotten it wrong. A commonplace of Biblical scholarship today, Spinoza was one of few in the past who was willing to allow that the Bible was written by different men with differing viewpoints and differing goals, and that what we know as the Bible was assembled long after the fact. He accepts the existence of error and goes to great lengths to find errors. But even assuming that the Bible is a source of literal laws and understanding for mankind, assuming that it has come down to us untouched by history and compiled exactly as it should have been...
Okay, so what's the point then? Why read Scripture? Can we get anything out of it? Absolutely. "We may conclude . . . that the whole Divine law, as taught by Scripture, has come down to us uncorrupted." (173) And that message is? "[I]t is not true doctrines which are expressly required by the Bible, so much as doctrines which are necessary for obedience [to God], and to confirm in our hearts the love of our neighbor." (186) For Spinoza the two goals are the same. To be obedient to God is to live charitably and justly, and nothing more (don't let the word obedience fool you; there is no intonation of servitude in Spinoza's writings on the subject). Other laws are important insofar as they enforce charity and justice. How one gets to those two is irrelevant, so long as they do. In this vein Spinoza argues for complete religious liberty. A man can believe what specific doctrines he wants, so long as he is obedient to God. Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, hell, Buddhist doesn't matter. If one loves one's neighbor, that is all that is needed. The real enemies of religion are the schismatics who hold that others are heretics because they differ on interpretation while following right action.
The above also defines the differentiation between faith and reason. Reason is all about determining truth; by its very nature it only allows one answer. Faith cares not a whit about right belief but about right action; simply do good things and the rest is alright, whatever opinion you may hold. In Spinoza's words: "Philosophy has no end in view save truth: faith, as we have abundantly proved, looks for nothing but obedience and piety." (189) Thus reason can do what it wants, and faith will not be involved.
One note on that last sentence. It may be objected that reason may argue against the right action suggested by faith. Spinoza, being a true Enlightenment man, does not believe this to be so, and his political writings (which take up the last couple chapters of this treatise) point in this direction. Though he almost argues from a Hobbesian viewpoint of absolute sovereign power in the name of security, and in fact argues that we should obey everything the sovereign does even in religious matters, he states the only way to have a sovereign that is really secure is to allow free thought and good treatment of subjects. "[T]he true aim of government is liberty." (259) Anything else would not only be unkind but dangerous and divisive, and thus not a good choice by reason's standard.
And in thus wise Spinoza gave his views on man and God, views I find impressive even now. He shows throughout a common-sense understanding of the imperfection of man and does not take for granted easy answers to religious problems. He is abstract when it calls for it and literal when clarity suggests it. The man who struck me as so odd in the past returns as one of the clearest philosophers I have ever read, as well as one of the most honest. Perhaps this is why so many people were against him in his own time. It is fortunate that posterity treats him better, for there is no doubt in my mind that he deserves more.
-----
Next up: The one, the only, Kant.
I initially became familiar with the name of Spinoza when I was just coming to learn about philosophy for the first time. It was through a History of Modern Phil. course. At that point I became rather biased against him. The reasons, as they usually are at first, were not very good ones, but first impressions usually take more work than they should to eliminate. Basically it seemed to me that his views didn't seem very sensible. What does he mean, everything is the same thing in different modes? That sounds stupid. And that, in summary, was my knowledge of Spinoza
Time wore away the rash prejudices one holds towards philosophers in general, and now reading the Tractatus has changed the way I view this particular man roughly 180 degrees. That is to say, what I find remarkable about Spinoza now is his great deal of good sense.
Let us start with the conflict that has been viewed through several works here recently: that of faith and reason. Maimonides held that the two are not at all in conflict, that they can and must work together. As a result he tried to give reasonable explanations for everything in Scripture, while at the same time holding fast to the assumptions he carries from Muslim philosophy and Scripture in general. For the most part he does well, though success is far from certain. Pascal, on the other hand, held that reason has no place in trying to understand Biblical concepts: religious faith is a matter of feeling. Perhaps feeling is a good ground for faith, but one risks taking the 'reasonableness' from religion, especially in a world where people can and do disagree fundamentally about the most basic points.
It must first be remarked that Spinoza does not hold faith and reason to be compatible. They are different, and that is that: "[T]o separate faith from philosophy . . . is the chief aim of this whole treatise." (183) Spinoza's own division of works demonstrates this: The Ethics is his chief philosophical work, and the Tractatus is his religious work. As far as Maimonidean compatibilism, he mentions Maimonides by more than once, and flat out rejects his efforts.
But, and this is a big but, that in now way implies that we don't reason about Scripture. To believe in Biblical literalism, for Spinoza, is just as stupid as thinking one can reconcile everything religious with reason. Why? Well, as Spinoza does not hesitate to point out, the Bible contradicts itself, and more than once. And not just metaphorically, it literally says opposite things: "[I]t is untrue that Scripture never contradicts itself directly, but only by implication." (193) On this front he brings out example after example, mentioning not only historical details but characteristics of God as well. Can't we just say one reading is literal and the other metaphorical, like Maimonides does? His thoughts on metaphor are explicit, and can be summed up with this statement on literalists: "If the Bible could everywhere be interpreted after their fashion, there would be no such thing as a rational statement of which the meaning could be relied on . . . ." (153) Analyzing some statements as metaphors would put understanding of the Bible under the control of whoever is doing the analysis, and would essentially leave faith at the whim of interpreters. As I asked previously, which interpretation does one follow, and how does one know it is the correct one? Spinoza recognizes this problem and rejects metaphor to avoid it.
If we reject both literalism and metaphor, can we take from the Bible? How do we know what is truth and what is not? The truth, it so happens, is in the message, not the exact words. This is...unusually sensible for a time centuries past. What is the message? That God chose the Jews? That one must keep the Sabbath? That one must pray to the one God? No, no, and no. Ultimately, the story in the Bible is not only imperfect but unnecessary.
I...What?
I show that the Word of God has not been revealed as a certain number of books, but was displayed to the prophets as a simple idea of the Divine mind, namely, obedience to God in singleness of heart, and in the practice of justice and charity; and I further point out, that this doctrine is set forth in Scripture in accordance with the opinions and understandings of those, among whom the Apostles and Prophets preached, to the end that men might receive it willingly, and with their whole heart. (9)
...and nothing more.
The idea that the Bible is a literal history of all creation is wrong. The idea that the Law of God is a set of rules on a block of stone to be followed for all history is wrong. The prophets who told us the instructions for living were not superhuman; they contradicted each other and held the basic misunderstandings of their time. "[T]o suppose that knowledge of natural and spiritual phenomena can be gained from the prophetic books, is an utter mistake . . . ." (27) The prophets, Spinoza says, even misunderstood miracles, in that they witnessed explainable events and gave them the name of miracles and wonders as they did not understand the real cause. Yes, we are allowing science to tell us that parts of the Bible aren't God acting and smiting and whatnot.
The above understanding of prophets informs Spinoza's entire method of Scriptural interpretation. There is no search for literal statements or even a universal list of laws, in terms of a list of commands to be followed. "We are at work not on the truth of passages, but solely on their meaning." (105) The events covered in the Bible were not universal - they were events only concerning the Jews, made so that the Jews would come to understand what is essential, and thus not geared (and therefore unnecessary for) any other groups. That is to say, the very Ten Commandments are the commandments of the ancient Hebrew people; others are in no way bound by them. "All Scripture was written primarily for an entire people, and secondarily for the whole human race." And there are more explicit statements of this within. The events that occurred to the Jews and the messages of the prophets were all geared specifically towards that group of people with an end which we shall see shortly. Those messages do not apply to us if they do not have the same effect. Spinoza goes so far as to challenge the notion of a chosen people of God: "[W]herein man's true happiness consists, they were on a par with the rest of the nations." When they referred to themselves as God's people, it was because they had explicitly made a contract with God to form a state. That is all.
Not only that, but it's not as though the Bible is exactly as it should be, anyway. Recall: this is the mid-1600s. This is a Judeo-Christian thinker writing a theological treatise. Now observe:
[T]he history of the Bible is not so much imperfect as untrustworthy. (120)
[A]ll the materials were promiscuously collected and heaped together . . . . (135)
The books were not guarded by posterity by such care that no faults crept in. (139)
That's right, the writers may have gotten it wrong. A commonplace of Biblical scholarship today, Spinoza was one of few in the past who was willing to allow that the Bible was written by different men with differing viewpoints and differing goals, and that what we know as the Bible was assembled long after the fact. He accepts the existence of error and goes to great lengths to find errors. But even assuming that the Bible is a source of literal laws and understanding for mankind, assuming that it has come down to us untouched by history and compiled exactly as it should have been...
[W]e ought to be familiar with Jewish phrases and metaphors (and language, as Spinoza notes earlier); anyone who did not make sufficient allowance for these . . . would thus miss the knowledge not only of what actually happened, but also of the mind of the writers of the sacred text. (94)
Okay, so what's the point then? Why read Scripture? Can we get anything out of it? Absolutely. "We may conclude . . . that the whole Divine law, as taught by Scripture, has come down to us uncorrupted." (173) And that message is? "[I]t is not true doctrines which are expressly required by the Bible, so much as doctrines which are necessary for obedience [to God], and to confirm in our hearts the love of our neighbor." (186) For Spinoza the two goals are the same. To be obedient to God is to live charitably and justly, and nothing more (don't let the word obedience fool you; there is no intonation of servitude in Spinoza's writings on the subject). Other laws are important insofar as they enforce charity and justice. How one gets to those two is irrelevant, so long as they do. In this vein Spinoza argues for complete religious liberty. A man can believe what specific doctrines he wants, so long as he is obedient to God. Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, hell, Buddhist doesn't matter. If one loves one's neighbor, that is all that is needed. The real enemies of religion are the schismatics who hold that others are heretics because they differ on interpretation while following right action.
The above also defines the differentiation between faith and reason. Reason is all about determining truth; by its very nature it only allows one answer. Faith cares not a whit about right belief but about right action; simply do good things and the rest is alright, whatever opinion you may hold. In Spinoza's words: "Philosophy has no end in view save truth: faith, as we have abundantly proved, looks for nothing but obedience and piety." (189) Thus reason can do what it wants, and faith will not be involved.
One note on that last sentence. It may be objected that reason may argue against the right action suggested by faith. Spinoza, being a true Enlightenment man, does not believe this to be so, and his political writings (which take up the last couple chapters of this treatise) point in this direction. Though he almost argues from a Hobbesian viewpoint of absolute sovereign power in the name of security, and in fact argues that we should obey everything the sovereign does even in religious matters, he states the only way to have a sovereign that is really secure is to allow free thought and good treatment of subjects. "[T]he true aim of government is liberty." (259) Anything else would not only be unkind but dangerous and divisive, and thus not a good choice by reason's standard.
And in thus wise Spinoza gave his views on man and God, views I find impressive even now. He shows throughout a common-sense understanding of the imperfection of man and does not take for granted easy answers to religious problems. He is abstract when it calls for it and literal when clarity suggests it. The man who struck me as so odd in the past returns as one of the clearest philosophers I have ever read, as well as one of the most honest. Perhaps this is why so many people were against him in his own time. It is fortunate that posterity treats him better, for there is no doubt in my mind that he deserves more.
-----
Next up: The one, the only, Kant.
posted by Derek at 12:05 PM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home