Is Cultural Discourse Relativist?
There is one more objection to the project as a whole that we should deal with before we get started, and that is the charge of relativism. Relativism, in short, is the idea that all truths or values are relative, that there is no objective standard of judgment, and thus that there is no true right or wrong. This can be applied to our project mainly as a criticism of our attempt at an impartial standpoint: what we are doing in this blog is trying to build a structural analysis of the elements of culture and how particular cultures operate. In a sense, what we are doing is a softer form of science: given the observations we make about culture, we want to develop a picture that accounts for those phenomena and allows us predictive power to explain phenomena outside of our grasp. So we will, for example, examine phenomena in American culture and see if we can find a model which describes the forces at work and material being worked upon in a way that both explains what we see and allows us to make sense of other phenomena as they arise. (Unfortunately, the actual process won’t be this ideally clean: I will be picking particular topics, and I will be providing theories of my own to work through them, rather than simply collecting data and formulating hypotheses after. But then again, science is not ideal either.)
The problem with this, so the relativism charge goes, is that cultural discussion is not a field where you can just impartially observe and describe phenomena. Culture is a realm of human behavior, and of behavior in society. Thus, it must be guided by norms of right and wrong, by good standards and practices. Unlike when dealing with groups of animals, there is an imperative to discuss what sorts activities and social structures are right and wrong in a normative (i.e. in the context of ethics) way. Our analysis will not do this; instead, we will be focusing on description rather than prescription, on describing things as they happen rather than on whether they are right or wrong.
It might not be clear yet how serious this objection is, so let me explain. Let’s say that we discuss the Tea Party phenomenon that has arisen in American politics. There has been much recent talk not only about the merits of their position, but about topics such as whether they are a danger to democracy, whether they are in fact democracy in a truer form, whether their sort of methods should be permitted or not based on what could happen in the future, and so on. Furthermore, the Tea Party is something that it is difficult to be impartial about; they invoke emotion in their approach, and receive emotional responses both affirmative and dismissive. Their loud, aggressive nature seems to require more than just a descriptive response; one should expect a judgment on them. Are they a danger? Are they a great move forward? What do we do with them? By and large, I will try to avoid that. If I discuss the Tea Party, I will be interested in just describing what forces are at work behind them and where they might lead. I will likely discuss whether they appear to endanger civil society and how such danger, if it exists, might be averted, but I will not on such grounds call them terrible, immoral, or foolish; instead of offering the prescriptions of the preacher, I will offer those of the medical doctor. I will try to avoid judgments when I can, except when it is a part of the process of explanation (which is to say, of course, that there most certainly will be judgments; they just won’t be of the kind we first think of when we hear the word ‘judgment’).
So to explain the relativism objection again: I am offering a simple description of social phenomena as such. I try to avoid making political or moral judgments, as I don’t consider that to be my aim. However, there are times where moral judgments are right or necessary, and I should not exempt myself from them. Furthermore, it may be the case that, by not casting judgment, I give the appearance of balance where there is none. I get the feeling that this last charge will be the most common one: that, say, in offering a description of the phenomena that produce the Tea Party, but not making a judgment as to the rightness of their cause, I will be seen as giving them equal treatment with opposed groups or positions which clearly seem superior. To use a more extreme example which cuts to the heart of the matter: I might describe the rise of the Nazis and say that “this is how the Nazis emerged” without judgment, as though it’s just a fact of nature and excuses the actions of the Nazis. Thus, the relativism charge says that no one is accountable in my view, because I treat every group or individual as a product of the forces that I am describing, without saying that, say, the Nazis formed not only a wrongheaded but a terribly immoral view: the most I will say is that Nazi fascism is a major threat to individual rights in a society, and that’s not enough to place the Nazis in the context they belong, namely as genocidal terrorists. I forgive the Nazi by giving his side of the story, so to speak.
First I should discuss the question of will. The underlying assumption in the argument just given is that I assume the person to be a product of factors outside his control, be they nature or nurture: the Nazi is the product of indoctrination, or of inborn tendencies to anger combined with the opportunity provided by the Nazi party. By being a product of outside forces, the Nazi is absolved of guilt. But I don’t make this assumption, at least not as it’s been explained here.
First, as to the metaphysical question of free will: do I assume here that everything is ultimately caused by factors outside of us, and so that we have no control over our own actions? In part, my response is that that isn't what concerns me here. I'm not interested in metaphysical debates about free will, just as the applied ethicist isn't interested in debates about freedom of the will. If you are an applied ethicist, as opposed to a theoretical or meta-ethicist, then your concerns will not be about questions so broad as the freedom of the will; rather, you will take the situation on the ground as a given and work from there. I operate in a similar fashion; rather than taking big metaphysical positions, I am simply working with the observation that there are influences on our behavior, both innate to our physiology and coming from literal external sources. Even if one assumes that institutions and physiology guide our behavior, it then follows that a change in the institutions and physiology (the latter being more and more of a possibility today) can change our behavior, assuming that the individual is determined totally by those causes, which are both outside of the will. One could then ascribe the change in those individuals to institutions, which were then shaped by previous individuals, and so on ad infinitum; in the end, there is no clear 'first cause' given our mode of operation (empirical and inductive), so the answer to the free will question is an unknown.
Metaphysically, it appears to be unknown; what tips the scales for our purposes is the simple observation that we act as though we have free will. We 'choose,' and in putting it in those terms assume that it's our will that chooses. This is how we always operate; and so, whatever the metaphysical answer is, we will operate under a framework of free will, broadly speaking. I don't disallow the possibility of ethical judgments, then.
But this isn't really the objection against me here. The objection is that I just don't make those judgments; even if I act as though I believe in free will, I'm not judging the Nazi as I should. I am excusing the Nazi because nature and nurture made him what he is; what I need to do is say that his choices were wrong, and that we need to shape conditions so as to avoid people like him. Given that, let’s answer the question: is it my job to make judgments? My argument is simple: I don’t have to. Not only that, I don’t yet have the right to, nor does anyone else, without a proper understanding of the nature of the matter. One must know what is going on before one has the right to cast judgments about better or worse. There is no shame, then, in description without prescription; description is a necessary part of the process, and is furthermore the necessary antecedent to any worthwhile prescription. My work is justified in itself from the relativism charge, because it is necessary to know the facts of the matter without having yet cast judgments.
Which is really the core of the matter: those who object, say, to a neutral description of the Tea Party or the Nazis do so in virtually every case because they’ve already made their moral judgment. I take Socrates’ position: all that I know is that as yet I know nothing. To this I add: and so, it would be rather silly of me to judge. Perhaps the judging reader is wiser than me: if so, then good for that person. But many are not, and, even worse, many are fools without realizing it. It is them that I wish most urgently to reach, and them who are most in need of what I offer. So the sort of work I do is not only justified, it is exactly the sort of thing that should be done. It provides the grounds of proper judgment to those who are not yet ready to make such judgments. Or, to paint a less idealistic picture, it offers the chance to more carefully consider one’s judgments so that they might be better made. It is in this spirit that I begin.
The problem with this, so the relativism charge goes, is that cultural discussion is not a field where you can just impartially observe and describe phenomena. Culture is a realm of human behavior, and of behavior in society. Thus, it must be guided by norms of right and wrong, by good standards and practices. Unlike when dealing with groups of animals, there is an imperative to discuss what sorts activities and social structures are right and wrong in a normative (i.e. in the context of ethics) way. Our analysis will not do this; instead, we will be focusing on description rather than prescription, on describing things as they happen rather than on whether they are right or wrong.
It might not be clear yet how serious this objection is, so let me explain. Let’s say that we discuss the Tea Party phenomenon that has arisen in American politics. There has been much recent talk not only about the merits of their position, but about topics such as whether they are a danger to democracy, whether they are in fact democracy in a truer form, whether their sort of methods should be permitted or not based on what could happen in the future, and so on. Furthermore, the Tea Party is something that it is difficult to be impartial about; they invoke emotion in their approach, and receive emotional responses both affirmative and dismissive. Their loud, aggressive nature seems to require more than just a descriptive response; one should expect a judgment on them. Are they a danger? Are they a great move forward? What do we do with them? By and large, I will try to avoid that. If I discuss the Tea Party, I will be interested in just describing what forces are at work behind them and where they might lead. I will likely discuss whether they appear to endanger civil society and how such danger, if it exists, might be averted, but I will not on such grounds call them terrible, immoral, or foolish; instead of offering the prescriptions of the preacher, I will offer those of the medical doctor. I will try to avoid judgments when I can, except when it is a part of the process of explanation (which is to say, of course, that there most certainly will be judgments; they just won’t be of the kind we first think of when we hear the word ‘judgment’).
So to explain the relativism objection again: I am offering a simple description of social phenomena as such. I try to avoid making political or moral judgments, as I don’t consider that to be my aim. However, there are times where moral judgments are right or necessary, and I should not exempt myself from them. Furthermore, it may be the case that, by not casting judgment, I give the appearance of balance where there is none. I get the feeling that this last charge will be the most common one: that, say, in offering a description of the phenomena that produce the Tea Party, but not making a judgment as to the rightness of their cause, I will be seen as giving them equal treatment with opposed groups or positions which clearly seem superior. To use a more extreme example which cuts to the heart of the matter: I might describe the rise of the Nazis and say that “this is how the Nazis emerged” without judgment, as though it’s just a fact of nature and excuses the actions of the Nazis. Thus, the relativism charge says that no one is accountable in my view, because I treat every group or individual as a product of the forces that I am describing, without saying that, say, the Nazis formed not only a wrongheaded but a terribly immoral view: the most I will say is that Nazi fascism is a major threat to individual rights in a society, and that’s not enough to place the Nazis in the context they belong, namely as genocidal terrorists. I forgive the Nazi by giving his side of the story, so to speak.
First I should discuss the question of will. The underlying assumption in the argument just given is that I assume the person to be a product of factors outside his control, be they nature or nurture: the Nazi is the product of indoctrination, or of inborn tendencies to anger combined with the opportunity provided by the Nazi party. By being a product of outside forces, the Nazi is absolved of guilt. But I don’t make this assumption, at least not as it’s been explained here.
First, as to the metaphysical question of free will: do I assume here that everything is ultimately caused by factors outside of us, and so that we have no control over our own actions? In part, my response is that that isn't what concerns me here. I'm not interested in metaphysical debates about free will, just as the applied ethicist isn't interested in debates about freedom of the will. If you are an applied ethicist, as opposed to a theoretical or meta-ethicist, then your concerns will not be about questions so broad as the freedom of the will; rather, you will take the situation on the ground as a given and work from there. I operate in a similar fashion; rather than taking big metaphysical positions, I am simply working with the observation that there are influences on our behavior, both innate to our physiology and coming from literal external sources. Even if one assumes that institutions and physiology guide our behavior, it then follows that a change in the institutions and physiology (the latter being more and more of a possibility today) can change our behavior, assuming that the individual is determined totally by those causes, which are both outside of the will. One could then ascribe the change in those individuals to institutions, which were then shaped by previous individuals, and so on ad infinitum; in the end, there is no clear 'first cause' given our mode of operation (empirical and inductive), so the answer to the free will question is an unknown.
Metaphysically, it appears to be unknown; what tips the scales for our purposes is the simple observation that we act as though we have free will. We 'choose,' and in putting it in those terms assume that it's our will that chooses. This is how we always operate; and so, whatever the metaphysical answer is, we will operate under a framework of free will, broadly speaking. I don't disallow the possibility of ethical judgments, then.
But this isn't really the objection against me here. The objection is that I just don't make those judgments; even if I act as though I believe in free will, I'm not judging the Nazi as I should. I am excusing the Nazi because nature and nurture made him what he is; what I need to do is say that his choices were wrong, and that we need to shape conditions so as to avoid people like him. Given that, let’s answer the question: is it my job to make judgments? My argument is simple: I don’t have to. Not only that, I don’t yet have the right to, nor does anyone else, without a proper understanding of the nature of the matter. One must know what is going on before one has the right to cast judgments about better or worse. There is no shame, then, in description without prescription; description is a necessary part of the process, and is furthermore the necessary antecedent to any worthwhile prescription. My work is justified in itself from the relativism charge, because it is necessary to know the facts of the matter without having yet cast judgments.
Which is really the core of the matter: those who object, say, to a neutral description of the Tea Party or the Nazis do so in virtually every case because they’ve already made their moral judgment. I take Socrates’ position: all that I know is that as yet I know nothing. To this I add: and so, it would be rather silly of me to judge. Perhaps the judging reader is wiser than me: if so, then good for that person. But many are not, and, even worse, many are fools without realizing it. It is them that I wish most urgently to reach, and them who are most in need of what I offer. So the sort of work I do is not only justified, it is exactly the sort of thing that should be done. It provides the grounds of proper judgment to those who are not yet ready to make such judgments. Or, to paint a less idealistic picture, it offers the chance to more carefully consider one’s judgments so that they might be better made. It is in this spirit that I begin.
posted by Derek at 11:43 PM
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