Deterministic Regress
A long time ago I promised something about free will. Well a few months or so later, and coming from a rather different train of thought, here’s something for ya. This actually all came out without prior thought (I'm rather proud of myself for that), so don’t be surprised to find errors of some sort. Still, I’m quite happy with what I have so far.
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Sartre tells us that either we are completely free or we are complete slaves. When one thinks about it this seems to be true. Let’s say that we accept that some of our choices are not ours to control. I am not a woman. I am not in Bosnia-Herzegovina right now. These facts are due to the particular situation I am in. I am, as Heidegger puts it, “being-in-the-world”. I do not spontaneously create history; I start out already in a situation, and that situation affects what possibilities I can actualize.
Let’s go a bit further. Because I am born in a situation, I have a past. When I make a decision I reflect on what has happened before. I will not have meatloaf today, because it was not good the last time I had it. Do I have free will to make this choice? Let’s take another example and then come back. Am I free to wear a frilly dress today? It seems like technically yes, I can. But just how free am I in such a choice? The past tells me that a lot of people might be offended, and some might become a threat. Thus my choice is not so much of a choice, it seems.
Here’s where the regress starts. Some of my options are determined, either by the nature of the world itself or by my experiences of the world. But we want to say that other actions are free. But if we assume that the world is a material one, and we assume the axiom of cause and effect, it seems that we will inevitably break down those supposedly free actions to other effects not our own. I don’t like meatloaf, but that is the result of a past, not of my free choice. Sartre at this point says that in fact we decide how we feel, past be damned. The conscience makes its own choice. But can it? Will not other things come to bear?
In this manner, if cause and effect is assumed fully, it seems that Sartre is right in claiming that we are either fully free or fully enslaved. One thing follows from another. A totally free choice would in effect be an uncaused event, a causa sui. It would have to be since it cannot be decided by any other circumstances. But then, what is that causa sui? What is it that is outside the world of cause and effect. If we assume a completely materialistic world, nothing. This is the view of science, and as such science operates on deterministic principles. It is here that I just now begin to see a greater curiosity in Sartre’s positing of consciousness as nothing; perhaps in this way it can be outside the system. But for him consciousness is parasitic, that is, always consciousness of something. Is consciousness not then shaped by that something? It is not that thing, as he says, but what then can we say about consciousness? If anything concrete is posited, it becomes a part of the system and free will is lost. I haven’t read enough Sartre to say if he has an answer to this, but in time perhaps.
But the reason I started this was to talk about a regress, and here I continue that. So cause and effect, given a system that is totally subject to it, has determinism as a necessary consequence. But how far back does it go? It must go back infinitely. If it does not, it stops at something with no prior cause; that is, the causa sui. But what is this infinite regress of causes? I think I will not be disregarded out of hand for saying that we cannot comprehend an infinite regress. If not, though, that means we cannot comprehend a fully deterministic world. Thus, even if it is the case, we cannot be honestly aware of it, and in fact cannot know unless we manage to prove the full regress, which is impossible. Free will faces the same problem in understanding the causa sui that is the only possible free agent. The ultimate source of will seems to me, then, to be something of a black box: it seems to be traced back to something we know not where, with answers we can’t quite make sense of.
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Going back to Sartre for a bit:
"Thus freedom is not a being. It is the being of man."
This is how Sartre maintains free will, and free will in its absolute form. To be is to be a thing. That is, to be defined, to be determined. A thing is this, not that. But consciousness is nothing. It is not defined, not determined to be something or other because it is not any thing.
As regards to the outside affecting our choices, he says "to be is to choose oneself; nothing comes to it either from the outside or from within which it can receive or accept." This is because consciousness is a reaching outward. It is only defined in terms of other things, what it is not. Things by definition are completely inert; they do not reach anywhere. So, we must reach for them. In this way he has defended free will.
I disagree. Let's assume consciousness is reaching outward and is also nothing. It chooses to reach outwards in certain directions and not others. But how is that choice made? It doesn't just reach out at random, I think we can accept that much, for if not then there is not human purpose, and human being for Sartre is essentially a search for purpose (being for itself, that which strives to be). How then does it choose? If it's not at random, it is for a reason. And is the reason generated within consciousness? But even then, what is it based off of?
Here I would go to Heidegger. I mentioned before being-in-the-world. The world starts before us. Do we not absorb that which is outside of us before we consciously choose? We grasp things to create meaning; that does not mean that that grasping will not be shaped by prior circumstances that were ultimately outside of our power. Human being may not be something, but that does not mean that its seeking to be is outside of the cause-effect problem.
"Human reality cannot receive its ends, as we have seen, either from outside or from a so-called inner "nature". It chooses them...." (emphasis mine) But choice implies reason, and a reason is a cause. Perhaps we do try to objectify our causes, like Sartre says a few pages back, but that is not a denial of the fact of a cause.
"From this point of view - and if it is understood that the existence of the Dasein precedes and commands its essence - human reality in and through its very upsurge decides to define its own being by its ends." But Dasein does not precede the world: Dasein means literally, "There it is," and we can ask, "Where?" And if the world has some affect on our choice of ends?
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Sartre tells us that either we are completely free or we are complete slaves. When one thinks about it this seems to be true. Let’s say that we accept that some of our choices are not ours to control. I am not a woman. I am not in Bosnia-Herzegovina right now. These facts are due to the particular situation I am in. I am, as Heidegger puts it, “being-in-the-world”. I do not spontaneously create history; I start out already in a situation, and that situation affects what possibilities I can actualize.
Let’s go a bit further. Because I am born in a situation, I have a past. When I make a decision I reflect on what has happened before. I will not have meatloaf today, because it was not good the last time I had it. Do I have free will to make this choice? Let’s take another example and then come back. Am I free to wear a frilly dress today? It seems like technically yes, I can. But just how free am I in such a choice? The past tells me that a lot of people might be offended, and some might become a threat. Thus my choice is not so much of a choice, it seems.
Here’s where the regress starts. Some of my options are determined, either by the nature of the world itself or by my experiences of the world. But we want to say that other actions are free. But if we assume that the world is a material one, and we assume the axiom of cause and effect, it seems that we will inevitably break down those supposedly free actions to other effects not our own. I don’t like meatloaf, but that is the result of a past, not of my free choice. Sartre at this point says that in fact we decide how we feel, past be damned. The conscience makes its own choice. But can it? Will not other things come to bear?
In this manner, if cause and effect is assumed fully, it seems that Sartre is right in claiming that we are either fully free or fully enslaved. One thing follows from another. A totally free choice would in effect be an uncaused event, a causa sui. It would have to be since it cannot be decided by any other circumstances. But then, what is that causa sui? What is it that is outside the world of cause and effect. If we assume a completely materialistic world, nothing. This is the view of science, and as such science operates on deterministic principles. It is here that I just now begin to see a greater curiosity in Sartre’s positing of consciousness as nothing; perhaps in this way it can be outside the system. But for him consciousness is parasitic, that is, always consciousness of something. Is consciousness not then shaped by that something? It is not that thing, as he says, but what then can we say about consciousness? If anything concrete is posited, it becomes a part of the system and free will is lost. I haven’t read enough Sartre to say if he has an answer to this, but in time perhaps.
But the reason I started this was to talk about a regress, and here I continue that. So cause and effect, given a system that is totally subject to it, has determinism as a necessary consequence. But how far back does it go? It must go back infinitely. If it does not, it stops at something with no prior cause; that is, the causa sui. But what is this infinite regress of causes? I think I will not be disregarded out of hand for saying that we cannot comprehend an infinite regress. If not, though, that means we cannot comprehend a fully deterministic world. Thus, even if it is the case, we cannot be honestly aware of it, and in fact cannot know unless we manage to prove the full regress, which is impossible. Free will faces the same problem in understanding the causa sui that is the only possible free agent. The ultimate source of will seems to me, then, to be something of a black box: it seems to be traced back to something we know not where, with answers we can’t quite make sense of.
-----
Going back to Sartre for a bit:
"Thus freedom is not a being. It is the being of man."
This is how Sartre maintains free will, and free will in its absolute form. To be is to be a thing. That is, to be defined, to be determined. A thing is this, not that. But consciousness is nothing. It is not defined, not determined to be something or other because it is not any thing.
As regards to the outside affecting our choices, he says "to be is to choose oneself; nothing comes to it either from the outside or from within which it can receive or accept." This is because consciousness is a reaching outward. It is only defined in terms of other things, what it is not. Things by definition are completely inert; they do not reach anywhere. So, we must reach for them. In this way he has defended free will.
I disagree. Let's assume consciousness is reaching outward and is also nothing. It chooses to reach outwards in certain directions and not others. But how is that choice made? It doesn't just reach out at random, I think we can accept that much, for if not then there is not human purpose, and human being for Sartre is essentially a search for purpose (being for itself, that which strives to be). How then does it choose? If it's not at random, it is for a reason. And is the reason generated within consciousness? But even then, what is it based off of?
Here I would go to Heidegger. I mentioned before being-in-the-world. The world starts before us. Do we not absorb that which is outside of us before we consciously choose? We grasp things to create meaning; that does not mean that that grasping will not be shaped by prior circumstances that were ultimately outside of our power. Human being may not be something, but that does not mean that its seeking to be is outside of the cause-effect problem.
"Human reality cannot receive its ends, as we have seen, either from outside or from a so-called inner "nature". It chooses them...." (emphasis mine) But choice implies reason, and a reason is a cause. Perhaps we do try to objectify our causes, like Sartre says a few pages back, but that is not a denial of the fact of a cause.
"From this point of view - and if it is understood that the existence of the Dasein precedes and commands its essence - human reality in and through its very upsurge decides to define its own being by its ends." But Dasein does not precede the world: Dasein means literally, "There it is," and we can ask, "Where?" And if the world has some affect on our choice of ends?
posted by Derek at 9:06 PM
2 Comments:
Very well argued, Snurp. But like other areas of philosophy, science is catching up. Cognitive science and neurology have a lot of evidence that supports determinism.
The loss of free will will be (and really, already has been) the next major blow to the religious view of our place in the world. The first was astronomy, which removed humanity from the physical center of the creation. Then came evolution, which removed humanity from the biological center of creation. Finally comes cognitive science which has removed humanity from the center of their own existence. Given any brain state and the same sensory input, the next brain state inevitably follows. Free will is an illusion.
It took the world centuries to accept the first blow to our centrality. We are still arguing over the second. The battle over the third hasn't even begun.
Of course, we have the issue that all of science presupposes the cause-effect relationship, so it may be guilty of confirmation bias. But from a purely pragmatic standpoint, the validity of that assumption has proven true.
I want to ask about one statement you made, "I think I will not be disregarded out of hand for saying that we cannot comprehend an infinite regress." Why do think that we cannot comprehend an infinite regress?
What I mean is that we have no way of describing in full an infinite regress. All the terms cannot be put into a list, for example, because the list is infinite. This is important in order to understand what I'm saying against determinism. You are 100% right in saying that science is bringing us determinism on a platter. The basic factors of determinism like cause and effect are central to the scientific body of knowledge (and really, should they not be? Cause and effective is perhaps the best inductively supported claim in existence, and science works in large part by induction). Given that the world we understand scientifically is the material world, and it all falls into the realm of cause and effect to the best of our knowledge, further scientific investigation will no doubt continue the trend.
The problem is coming to understand life, the universe, and everything in a sense. Science keeps working up (towards bigger spaces) and down (towards smaller particles). Will it ever reach a terminal point? What would that point be? That is where the logical problem comes in. Either we reach some sort of base thing, the causa sui, or it goes on forever. But how would science identify/what would it say about a causa sui? And how do we know how far to go, or when we've reached the end? I don't think that, at least as far as science now seems capable of reaching, we can reach an answer strictly from the scientific viewpoint (but in the future, who knows?). Trying to reach that point through logic reaches the dilemma of the causa sui or infinity. The result is that the universe is deterministic in so far as we understand it. But is it completely so? Can't say. How much of a 'victory' this is is debatable, since it doesn't argue for either free will or determinism but is in fact something of an skeptic's position. But I think, taking everything there is as a sort of whole, it's the best answer we have at the moment.
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